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THE CHOICE BETWEEN MADISON AND FDR
RANDY BARNETT*

This exchange is about three clauses that have often been used
by the courts since the New Deal to expand federal power: the
Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the
Taxation Clause, from which the spending power has (at least
until today) been construed. This Essay addresses the originalist
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Now, because I have not studied the matter closely, I am not
going to comment on the spending power. I have always been
attracted, though, to Madison’s view that there is no freestanding spending power, but only a power to spend what is necessary and properly incident to the enumerated powers. Madison
did not believe that the spending power grew out of the taxation power, but instead that all exercises of the spending power
had to be incident to the other enumerated powers.1 I am not,
however, going to make the argument for this position here.
Nor am I going to spend much time discussing the original
meaning of the Commerce Clause. In my book, Restoring the Lost
Constitution,2 I identified every use of the word “commerce” in
the Constitutional Convention, the ratification debates, and the
Federalist Papers.3 In a separate study, I examined the over 1,500
times the word “commerce” appeared in the Philadelphia Gazette
between 1728 and 1800.4 In all of these appearances of the word
“commerce,” I could not find one clear example where the term
was used to apply more broadly than the meaning identified by
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University
Law Center.
1. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 264–65 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano
ed., 2000) (rejecting the proposition that “the power ‘to lay and collect taxes’ . . .
amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be
alleged to be necessary for the common defence or general welfare”).
2. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY (2004).
3. See id. at 278–89.
4. See id. at 289–91.
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Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion in Lopez,5 in which he
maintained that the word “commerce” refers to the trade and
exchange of goods, along with the process of trading and exchanging, including transportation.6
The January 13, 1790 issue of the Pennsylvania Gazette included
a representative use of the word “commerce” at the Founding:
Agriculture, manufacturers and commerce are acknowledged
to be the three great sources of wealth in any state. By the
first [agriculture] we are to understand not only tillage, but
whatever regards the improvement of the earth; as the
breeding of cattle, the raising of trees, plants and all vegetables that may contribute to the real use of man; the opening
and working of mines, whether of metals, stones, or mineral
drugs . . . . By the second [manufacturers], all the arts, manual and mechanic; . . . by the third [commerce], the whole extent of navigation with foreign countries.7

So this is how one source distinguished agriculture, manufacturing, and commerce; a very common trilogy that was repeatedly invoked.
For an originalist, direct evidence of the actual use of a word
is the most important source of the word’s meaning. It is more
important than referring to the “broader context.” Appealing to
the “larger context” or the “underlying principles” of the text is
the means by which some today are able to turn the words
“black” into “white” and “up” into “down.”
Now, it may come as some surprise to you to learn that even
the New Deal Supreme Court never formally broadened the
meaning of the term “commerce” in any of its cases. Instead, it
relied on an expanded interpretation of the Necessary and
Proper Clause to enlarge the powers of the national government. The New Deal Supreme Court never redefined the word
“commerce.” There is no case in which it said, “oh no, commerce means more today than it used to mean.” Instead the
Court expanded the use of the Necessary and Proper Clause to

5. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
6. Id. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“At the time the original Constitution was
ratified, ‘commerce’ consisted of selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for these purposes.”).
7. BARNETT, supra note 2, at 274.
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reach activity that it admitted was not commerce but which it
was necessary and proper to reach anyway.8
Thus, this Essay focuses on the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Now, unfortunately, because the Necessary and Proper Clause
uses a term of art, you cannot find its original meaning by examining how the word “necessary” or the word “proper” was
commonly used, the way you can when you are looking for a
term like “commerce.” You really do need to examine the context in which this phrase was introduced into the Constitution,
and how it was explained to the public when it was criticized
by the Anti-Federalists as conveying the kind of sweeping and
unlimited powers to Congress that Professor Michael Paulsen
has claimed for it,9 and that Justice Scalia described in his concurring opinion in Raich.10
***
The Necessary and Proper Clause was added to the Constitution by the Committee of Detail without any previous discussion by the Constitutional Convention. Nor was it the subject of
any debate from its initial proposal to the Convention’s final
adoption of the Constitution. The likely reason why the Necessary and Proper Clause received no attention from the Convention became clear during the ratification convention debates, as
did the Clause’s public meaning.
In the ratification debates, opponents of the Constitution
pointed to this clause as evidence that the national government
had virtually unlimited and undefined powers. In other words,
the Anti-Federalists said, “Look, we object to this Constitution
because it is going to lead to the very kind of powers that Professor Paulsen told you the federal government has.”11 In the New
8. See, e.g., United States v. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. 110, 121 (1942) (“We
conclude that the national power to regulate the price of milk moving interstate . . . extends to such control over intrastate transactions . . . as is necessary
and appropriate to make the regulations of the interstate commerce effective.”
(emphasis added)).
9. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Government of Adequate Powers, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 991, 995–96 (2008).
10. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34–35 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Where
necessary to make a regulation of interstate commerce effective, Congress may
regulate even those intrastate activities that do not themselves substantially affect
interstate commerce.”).
11. See Paulsen, supra note 9, at 992–93.
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York ratifying convention, for example, Anti-Federalist John
Williams contended that “[i]t is perhaps utterly impossible fully
to define this power.”12 For this reason, “[w]hatever they judge
necessary for the proper administration of the powers lodged in
them, they may execute without any check or impediment.”13
Federalist supporters of the Constitution repeatedly denied
the charge that all discretion over the scope of its own powers
effectively resided in Congress. They insisted that the Necessary and Proper Clause was not an additional freestanding
grant of power but merely made explicit what was already
implicit in the grant of each enumerated power. As explained
by George Nicholas in the Virginia ratifying convention, “the
Constitution had enumerated all the powers which the general government should have, but did not say how they were
to be exercised. It therefore, in this clause, tells how they shall
be exercised.”14 Like other Federalists, Nicholas denied that
this clause gave “any new power [to Congress].”15 “Suppose,”
he reasoned,
it had been inserted, at the end of every power, that they
should have power to make laws to carry that power into
execution; would this have increased their powers? If, therefore, it could not have increased their powers, if placed at the
end of each power, it cannot increase them at the end of all.16

In short, “[the C]lause only enables [the Congress] to carry into
execution the powers given to them. It gives them no additional
power.”17
James Madison, in Virginia, added his voice to the chorus,
when he said, “the sweeping clause . . . only extended to the
enumerated powers. Should Congress attempt to extend it to
any power not enumerated, it would not be warranted by the
clause.”18 Also in Virginia, Edmund Pendleton, President of the

12. 2 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 331 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., Ayer Co. Publishers 1987) (1836).
13. Id. at 338.
14. 3 DEBATES, supra note 12, at 245.
15. Id. at 245–46.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 246.
18. Id. at 455.
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Convention, insisted that this clause did not go “a single step
beyond the delegated powers.”19 If Congress were
about to pass a law in consequence of this clause, they must
pursue some of the delegated powers, but can by no means
depart from them or arrogate any new powers; for the plain
language of the clause is, to give them power to pass laws in
order to give effect to the delegated powers.20

The same point was made in the North Carolina convention.
In Pennsylvania, James Wilson explained that this clause “is
saying no more than that the powers we have already particularly given, shall be effectually carried into execution.”21 And
Thomas McKean insisted that “it gives to Congress no further
powers than those already enumerated.”22
So here, then, is the likely explanation for the lack of debate
surrounding the Clause at the Philadelphia Convention. If the
power to make law was already thought to be implicit in the
enumerated power scheme, it is not surprising that the Clause
would provoke no discussion at the Convention. Unfortunately,
most interpreters today, including many originalists, go no further in their investigation of the original meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause than Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in
McCulloch v. Maryland,23 written in 1819, some thirty years after
the ratification of the Constitution.
In McCulloch, Marshall upheld the constitutionality of the Second National Bank of the United States.24 The bill establishing the
second Bank had been signed into law by President James Madison, a man who had, as a Representative in the First Congress,
strongly objected to the constitutionality of the First National
Bank on the ground that it exceeded the enumerated powers of
Congress. Here is what Madison said in his speech to Congress:
Whatever meaning this clause may have, none can be admitted, that would give an unlimited discretion to Congress. Its
meaning must, according to the natural and obvious force of
the terms and the contexts, be limited to the means necessary
to the end, and incident to the nature of the specified powers.
19. Id. at 441.
20. Id.
21. 2 DEBATES, supra note 12, at 468.
22. Id. at 537.
23. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
24. Id.
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The clause is in fact merely declaratory of what would have
resulted by unavoidable implication, as the appropriate, and
as it were, technical means of executing those powers. In this
sense it had been explained by the friends of the constitution,
and ratified by the state conventions. The essential characteristics of the government, as composed of limited and enumerated powers, would be destroyed: If instead of direct and incidental means, any means could be used, which in the language
of the preamble to the bill, ‘might be conceived to be conducive
to the successful conducting of the finances; or might be conceived to tend to give facility to the obtaining of loans.’25

He then went on to say:
Mark the reasoning on which the validity of the bill depends.
To borrow money is made the end and the accumulation of
capitals, implied as the means. The accumulation of capitals is
then the end, and a bank implied as the means. The bank is then
the end, and a charter of incorporation, a monopoly, capital
punishments, &c. implied as the means. If implications, thus
remote and thus multiplied, can be linked together, a chain
may be formed that will reach every object of legislation,
every object within the whole compass of political economy.26

This was Representative Madison’s reason for opposing the
first Bank. Yet as President, decades later, he signed the bill
approving the second Bank. Did this mean he had abandoned
his earlier restrictive reading of “necessary and proper”?
Although Madison eventually came to be persuaded, by practice, that a national bank is incident enough to the enumerated
powers to be constitutional, he nevertheless strongly objected to
the opinion in McCulloch, in which Chief Justice Marshall famously equated the term “necessary” with mere convenience:
But what is of most importance is the high sanction given to
a latitude in expounding the Constitution which seems to
break down the landmarks intended by a specification of the
Powers of Congress, and to substitute for a definite connection between means and ends, a Legislative discretion as to
the former to which no practical limit can be assigned.27

Madison both acknowledged the supposedly modern insight
that the national economy is interconnected and rejected this in25. JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 484–85 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
26. Id. at 486.
27. Id. at 734.
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terconnection as a basis for a latitudinarian interpretation of
“necessary”:
In the great system of Political Economy having for its general object the national welfare, everything is related immediately or remotely to every other thing; and consequently a
Power over any one thing, if not limited by some obvious
and precise affinity, may amount to a Power over every
other. Ends & means may shift their character at the will &
according to the ingenuity of the Legislative Body.28

He then concluded with his real objection: “Is there a Legislative
power in fact, not expressly prohibited by the Constitution,
which might not, according to the doctrine of the Court, be exercised as a means for carrying into effect some specified Power?”29
And it was not just Madison who was displeased with
McCulloch. The popular outcry against McCulloch was so great
that Chief Justice Marshall himself felt moved to defend his decision in an essay he published anonymously under the name “A
Friend of the Constitution.”30 Imagine if former Chief Justice
Rehnquist had been so vilified for a judicial opinion he had written that he published anonymous op-eds in the Wall Street Journal
defending the opinion. But that is exactly what John Marshall did.
Here is a part of what Chief Justice Marshall said in defense
of McCulloch, which shows that even he denied that McCulloch
meant what it later came to be interpreted to mean:
In no single instance does the Court admit the unlimited
power of congress to adopt any measure whatever, and thus
to pass the limits prescribed by the constitution. Not only is
the discretion claimed for the legislature in the selection of
its means, always limited in terms, to such as are appropriate, but the court also expressly says, “should congress under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects, not entrusted to the government, it
would become the painful duty of this tribunal . . . to say
that such an act was not the law of the land.31

That is Chief Justice Marshall, not me, interpreting McCulloch v.
Maryland.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Essays from the Alexandria Gazette: John Marshall, “A Friend of the Constitution,” 21 STAN. L. REV. 456 (1969).
31. Id. at 478–79.
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So, who was right? Madison or Marshall? In an article on the
original meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause,32 I contended that the difference between Democratic-Republicans,
such as Madison and Jefferson, and Federalists, such as Hamilton and Marshall, was far less significant than it appears today.
On the one hand, both sides insisted that a law be “plainly
adapted” to an enumerated power, or what we today call a degree of “means-ends fit.” On the other hand, both sides rejected
the idea that “necessary” means “indispensably requisite,” the
meaning urged upon the McCulloch Court by the State of Maryland and properly rejected by Chief Justice Marshall. Madison
had much earlier rejected “indispensably requisite” as the proper
interpretation of “necessary” on the ground that it would make
federal governance nearly impossible.
The primary problem with reading McCulloch and other
Marshall opinions, like Gibbons v. Ogden,33 is seeing past the
gloss placed on these decisions by defenders of the Supreme
Court’s expansive interpretation of national powers to uphold
President Roosevelt’s New Deal program. The loose reading of
these Marshall Court opinions was advanced so the New Deal
Court’s jurisprudence could be characterized as a “restoration”
of original meaning, rather than the constitutional revolution
that even most progressive scholars today would readily admit
it was. The challenge for those who accept originalism is to distinguish between the Madisonian and the Rooseveltian interpretations of federal power, especially when the government
invokes the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Consider the medical cannabis case of Gonzalez v. Raich,34
which I argued in the Supreme Court. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas adopted a Madisonian interpretation:
The Necessary and Proper Clause is not a warrant to Congress to enact any law that bears some conceivable connection
to the exercise of an enumerated power. Nor is it, however, a
command to Congress to enact only laws which are absolutely indispensable to the exercise of an enumerated power.

32. Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. LAW 183 (2003).
33. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
34. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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. . . To act under the Necessary and Proper Clause, then,
Congress must select a means that is ‘appropriate’ and
‘plainly adapted’ to executing an enumerated power; and
the means cannot be otherwise prohibited by the Constitution. The means cannot be inconsistent ‘with the letter and
spirit of the [C]onstitution.’35
....
In sum, neither in enacting the [Controlled Substance Act]
nor in defending its application to respondents has the Government offered any obvious reason why banning medical
marijuana use is necessary to stem the tide of interstate drug
trafficking. Congress’ goal of curtailing the interstate drug
trade would not plainly be thwarted if it could not apply the
CSA to patients like Monson and Raich. That is, unless Congress’ aim is really to exercise police power of the sort reserved to the states in order to eliminate even the intrastate
possession and use of marijuana.36

I think we all know that is exactly what Congress was trying
to accomplish; it was not trying just to limit interstate commerce. It was trying to use its power over interstate commerce
to exert a police power over purely local conduct of a sort that
is reserved to the States. In short, the Congress is trying to
override the inherent constraints on its powers that result from
a federal system of government. As Justice Thomas wrote:
Even assuming the CSA’s ban on locally cultivated and
consumed marijuana is “necessary,” that does not mean it is
also “proper.”
....
Even if Congress may regulate purely intrastate activity
when essential to exercising some enumerated power, . . . [it]
may not use its incidental authority to subvert basic principles of federalism and dual sovereignty.37

In Raich, Justice Thomas did not deny that the enumerated
powers of Congress are supreme where they are inconsistent
with the exercise of the state police power. Rather, he claimed
that, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, it is an improper
extension of those enumerated powers to imply other powers that
35. Id. at 59–60.
36. Id. at 64 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 64–65.
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interfere with the fundamental principles of federalism and dual
sovereignty. In Raich, the Court upheld an implied power to reach
wholly intrastate, noneconomic activity even when it severely interfered with the police power of states to promote the health of
its citizens (and also to regulate the practice of medicine).
Now, contrast Justice Thomas’s dissent with Justice Scalia’s
concurring opinion in Raich, in which he adopted a Rooseveltian
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause:
Lopez and Morrison affirm that Congress may not regulate
“purely local” activities within the States based solely on the attenuated effect that such activity may have in the interstate
market. But those decisions do not declare noneconomic intrastate activities to be categorically beyond the reach of the Federal Government. Neither case involved the power of Congress
to exert control over intrastate activities in connection with a
more comprehensive scheme of regulation . . . . To dismiss this
distinction as “superficial and formalistic” is to misunderstand
the nature of the Necessary and Proper Clause, which empowers Congress to enact laws in effectuation of its enumerated
powers that are not within its authority to enact in isolation.38

What renders Justice Scalia’s interpretation of the Necessary
and Proper Clause “Rooseveltian” is his extreme deference to
the decision of Congress as to whether it really is essential to a
larger regulatory scheme for the legislation it passes to reach
wholly intrastate, noneconomic activities that, traditionally,
have been included within the police power of individual
states. Like Madison, the dissenters in Raich required some
showing of a means-ends fit. Like the New Deal Court, Justice
Scalia left the question of means-ends fit entirely up to Congress.
And also like the New Deal Court, he denied that this interference with the traditional police powers of states is an improper
construction of implied federal power.
***
The remarkably successful coalition that is the Federalist Society stands today at a crossroad. In one direction is a continuing
Madisonian commitment to originalism, according to which the
powers of the national government are limited, and these textual
limits are enforceable by courts. Just as the courts are restrained
from changing the meaning of the Constitution, so too is Congress.
38. Id. at 38–39 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
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In the other direction is a Rooseveltian commitment to judicial restraint above all else, a restraint that is justified by distorting original meaning, by creating some insurmountable burden
of proof before legislation can be overturned, or by claiming
that it is too late to revisit New Deal era “super-precedents.”39
Take your pick. Perhaps a jurisprudence of complete and total
judicial restraint, paired with unlimited national power, provides a better world than a jurisprudence of a written constitution with limited and enumerated national powers. But if that
is the road that the members of the Federalist Society choose to
take, then I suggest we change the silhouette in our banner
from that of James Madison to that of FDR.

39. See Randy E. Barnett, It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super-Precedent: A Reply
to Farber and Gerhard, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232 (2006).

